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ESTATE OF WIELING

[8. F. No. 17933.

Tn Bank.

[37 C.2d

May 4, 1951.J

Estate of ANDREW WIELING, Deceased. DA VID LUCHSINGER, as Administrator, etc., Appellant, v. ANDREW
WIELING, JR., as Executor, etc., Respondent.
[1] Husband and Wife-Transactions Inter Be-Property Bettle-

ment Agreements.-In an heirship proceeding in which the
status of property held in unequal amounts in the separate
names of deceased spouses was in issue, the court could reasonably conclude that, when the wife acquired the last parcel
taken in her name, she had achieved an equal division, where
there was testimony that the oral agreement that each of the
spouses should have half of the property was carried out, and
no evidence that the relative values of the properties remained
the same from the date of the last acquisition until the death
of the spouses.
[2] Id.-Transactions Inter Be-Changing Character of Property.
-In construing an agreement changing the status from community property to the separate property of the spouses.
which agreement was subject to conflicting inferences as to
the intention of the parties, the court could reasonably conclude that from the time the agreement was made the parties
intended that the property in the name of each spouse was
his or her separat(' property, where, thereafter, although the
wife collected rents on all the property, she paid taxes and
made repairs on her property only and made it clear to the
husband that he was solely responsible for the taxes on and
maintenance of his property.
[8] Decedents' Estates-Claims-Actions-Testimony of Parties.
-An heirship proceeding involving the community or separate
status of property of deceased spouses is not an action on a
claim or demand against the estate of a deceased person,
and the sole heir and devisee of the husband is not incompetent
to testify as to events occurring and contracts made prior t.
the deaths of the spouses. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1880.)
[4] Witnesses-Credibility-Province of Court and Jury.-It is
for the trial court to determine what credit shall be given to
the testimony of an interested witness.
[2] See 13 Cal.Jur. 845; 26 Am.Jur. 858.
[3) See llA Cal.Jur. 888,889.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Husband and Wife, § 157(8); [21
Husband and Wife, § 159; [3) Decedents' Estates, § 582; [4] Witnesses, § 281; [5] Husband and Wife, § 91 j [6] Husband and
Wife, §l74.
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[6] Husband and Wife-Property-Determination of CharacterEvidence.-In an heirship proceeding involving the .~om
munity or separate status of property of deceasl'd spOllses, a
finding that property held in the name of the deceased husband was his separate property is supported by testimony of
his sole heir and devisee that the spouses entered into an
agreement that each should have half of their property in
his or her own name and have it as his or her own property,
and that such agreement was carried out.
[6] Id.-Transactions Inter Se-Fraud and Undue Influence-Evidence.-In an heirship proceeding involving the community
or separate status of property of deceased spouses, the court
was justified in concluding that any presumption of unifue
influence or fraud in the execution of an agreement making
the property separate was rebuttl'd by evidence that the wife
was aware of the community status of thl' property when she
conceived and proposed the agreement, and that the husband
was (,Olltent to keep the property that stood in his nap.1C within
the community. (Civ. Code, §§ 158,2235.)

APPEAL from a judgm('nt of the Superior Court of
Contra Costa County determining that certain realty standing in name of deceased husband was llis separate property.
Hugh Dono-yan, Judge. Affirmed.
Lorne M. Stanley and Douglas A. Pease for Appellant.
Carlson, Collins & Gordon, Frederick Bold, Jr., and Harold
F. Sawallisch for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-The administrator of the estate of Matilda
Wieling appeals from a jUdgment of the probate court in an
heirship proceeding determining tbat certain real property
was the separate property of .Andrew 'Wieling and not his
and his wife's eommunity property.
Andrew and Matilda Wieling were married in 1912. Matilda had five children by a previous marriage, four of wbom
survived ber. Andrew Wieling, Jr., is tbe only cbild of the
marriage between Andrew and Matilda and is the sole beneficiary of Andrew's will. Andrew died January 13, 1947,
and Matilda May 9, 1947. During their marriage tbey acquired eleven parcels of real property. Title to seven of
these pareels was taken in Andrew's name, and title to the
remaining four in :Matilda's name. Tbe evidence is not
clear whether the money used to purchase the property was the

108

ESTATE OF WIELINO

[37 C.2d

community property or the separate property of either spouse.
One of the lots in Matilda's name was a gift from two of her
children.
On the basis of the foregoing evidence and applicable presumptions appellant contends that the property in Matilda's
name was her separate property (Civ. Code, § 164), and that
the property in Andrew's name was community property,
on the ground that it was acquired by him after marriage
other than by gift, bequest, devise, or descent. (Civ. Code,
§§ 168, 164.) Respondent Andrew Wieling, Jr., executor
of the estate of Andrew, contends that the property in
Andrew's name became his separate property by virtue of
an ora] agreement between him and Matilda. It is therefore
necessary to determine whether the evidence relating to the
alleged oral agreement sustains the trial court's finding that
the seven parcels in Andrew's name were his separate property.
Evidence of the agreement was presented by respondent,
who testified that in 1925, when Matilda took title'in her name
to the tenth parcel of property, Andrew asked her, "Why
wasn't it good enough to keep all of it in the community'"
She said, "I am going to have half of it in my name and half
in your name, and we each have our own property, and there
won't be any trouble about it." Respondent further testified: "My mother [Matilda] was going to have half in her
name, and my father [Andrew] was going to have half in
his name, and she was going to build up nntil she got that
much. . . . That plan was followed out right to a 'T'." At
the time the agreement was made there were seven parcels
in Andrew's name and two in Matilda's name. At that time
Matilda took title to a third parcel, and the following year
she took title to a fourth parcel No additional property
was acquired by either spouse, and at the time of their deaths
in 1947 the appraised value of the property in Andrew's
name was approximately twice that of the property in Matilda's name.
Appellant does not dispute the rule that by oral agreement
husband and wife can change the character of their property
(see Huber v. Huber, 27 Ca1.2d 784, 789 [167 P.2d 708];
Tomaier v. Tomaier, 28 Ca1.2d 754, 757-758 [146 P.2d 9051).
He contends that the agreement was not carried into effect,
since Matilda acquired only four parcels against Andrew's
seven, and since the property in Andrew's name was worth
approximately twice that in Matilda's. [1] There is no evi-
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dcnce. however. that the relative valueR of the properties remained the same in the 2] -year period between 1926. when
the last parcel was acquired, and the deaths of the spouses;
and since respondent testified that the agreement was carried
ont, the trial court could reasonably conclude that when
Matilda acquired the last parcel in 1926 she had achieved an
equal division.
Even if it be assumed, however, that Matilda did not
succeed in acquiring property equivalent in value to that
held by Andrew, it does not follow that the agreement
was ineffective to make the property in his name his separate
property. [2] It could be inferred from the terms of the
original agreement either that Matilda was not to lose her
interest in the community property until she acquired separate property equivalent in value to that held by Andrew,
or that the parties intended that the property held in the
name of each should immediately become separate property
and that any inequality should be rectified as additional
property was acquired. After the agreement Matilda regarded the property in Andrew's name as his property.
Although she collected rents on both his property and hers,
she paid taxes and made repairs on her property only and
made it 'clear to Andrew that he was solely responsible for
the taxes on and maintenance of his property. From this
evidence the trial court could reasonably conclude that from
the time the agreement was made the parties intended that
the property in the name of each spouse was his or her
separate property~
[3] Appellant contends, however, that the evidence does
not support the finding of the trial court because it consists
almost wholly of the testimony of respondent, an interested
witness, given after the parties to the contract were dead.
The present action, however, is not on a claim or demand
against the estate of a deceased person within the meaning of
s<'ction 1880 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Streeter v.
Martinelli, 65 Cal.App.2d 65, 71-72 [149 P.2d 725) ; Bollinger
v. Wright, 143 Cal. 292, 296 [76 P. 1108), and accordingly
respondent was not incompetent to testify to events occurring
before the deaths of the parties. [4] It was for the trial
court to determine what credit should be given his testimony
(Estate of Duncan, 9 Cal.2d 207, 217 [70 P.2d 174]).
[5] The trial court accepted it as true, and it supports th~
finding. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1844.)
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[6] Finally, appellant contends that under the agreement Andrew gained an advantage over his wife, and that
it must therefore be presumed that the agreement was the
result of undue influence or fraud. (See Civ. Code §§ 158,
2235; MC/lay v. McKay, 184 Cal. 742, 746 [195 P. 385].)
There is evidence, however, that Matilda was aware of the
status of the property at the time she proposed the agreement.
Andrew was willing to keep the property that stood in his
name within the community. Since the agreement was conceived by her and not the result of any suggestion or act
on the part of her husband, the trial court was justified in
concluding that any presumption of undue influence or
fraud had been rebutted. (Smith v. Lombard, 201 Cal. 518,
524-525 [258 P. 55].)
The judgment is affirmcd.

Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer,
J., and Spence, J., concurred.
/

